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Foreword
JAMES T. HAMILTON*

On November 13-14, 1992, Law and Contemporary Problems hosted a
conference at Duke Law School, sponsored by the Olin Foundation, entitled
"Regulating Regulation: The Political Economy of Administrative Procedures
and Regulatory Instruments." The conference papers published here reflect the
growing influence of the positive political theory ("PPT") of institutions in
studies of traditional legal questions of administrative and constitutional law.
The articles were written by political scientists, legal scholars, and economists
using a variety of methodologies: game theory, leading case analysis, case
studies, and statistical testing (including regression analysis). Taken together, the
articles focus attention on a large number of the actors involved in translating
legislative proposals into effective regulations: congressional committees and
coalitions; executive and independent agencies; the president and the executive
branch (especially the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB")); the
Supreme Court; appellate courts; interest groups; and voters, who often lurked
behind the scenes in the articles as the source of positions taken by reelectionminded legislators.
Two themes unite these disparate articles: the roles that information
problems play in the development and implementation of rules, and the impact
of institutional structure on regulatory policies. The statement that delegated
decisionmaking-whether it involves Congress granting discretion to an agency
or legislators authorizing committees to act as their agents-involves information
problems is not "news" to scholars familiar with principal-agent models. The
ability of regulators to use hidden action and hidden information to further their
own policies that may not be explicit in statutory language is part of the story of
tradeoffs between delegation and monitoring. What distinguishes the conference
papers is an attempt to determine the circumstances under which information
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conveyed by words and actions by legislative, judicial, executive, and interest
group actors can be credible and informative. Drawing on lessons from signaling
models in the economics of information, the authors emphasize how costly action
can convey information about the preferences and plans of parties involved in
the regulatory process. This point is summarized in two different articles by the
maxim "actions speak louder than words."
The signals discussed in the
regulatory environment include the attempts by congressional coalition leaders
and committee members to indicate to the courts the "meaning" of a statute, the
ability of interest groups to convey information about the nature of agency
actions to Congress, and the efforts by the Supreme Court to indicate to
appellate courts the policies to adopt with regard to agency discretion. While an
emphasis on the meaning of words and deeds is not new in models of administrative law, these articles take new analytical steps toward deriving the circumstances under which particular statements and actions convey information in the
interpretation of statutes or monitoring of agency action.
The second conference theme is one of the mantras of PPT: structures shape
outcomes (or, in other words, procedures produce policies). The articles address
many different questions involved in administrative law, for example: How or
why should courts look to congressional intent in statutory interpretation? Are
members of Congress, judges, or the agencies dominant in the development of
regulations? What roles do the president and OMB play in regulatory politics?
Each article, however, focuses on the power of institutional constraints to shape
the policy outcomes chosen. The mix of mathematical models, legal analysis, and
statistical testing in these articles should provide scholars interested in advancing
the theories of regulation and administrative law with new tools and evidence to
understand the policy environment. Results that emphasize how incentives in
policymaking structures affect outcomes should also be of interest to those
designing changes in the procedures that govern rulemaking and regulation.

